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Re: CIA Mgmt. Inf.  
700-4001  
20 April 1971  
Working Paper: NCF

SUBJECT: CIRIS Highlights

1. CIRIS, the successor to TOD, is now in its 4th annual cycle. In the present CIRIS exercise, we are now receiving inputs from the various Agencies, Services and Program Managers. We expect to turn out CIRIS reports in late May and in June.

2. CIRIS inputs are made by CIA (less Covert Action) and also by the following organizations and programs:

General Defense Intel. Prgm, including DIA and the three Services: (some 221 Reporting Entities).

Consol. Cryptologic Prgm, including NSA and the three Services: (some 220 Reporting Entities).

25X1 : (some 23 Reporting Entities).

me 20 Reporting Entities).

Advanced Prgm Support (6 Reporting Entities).

Other DoD Intelligence Activities (a number of specialized, sensitive activities that are not included in the above-mentioned programs): (some 15 Reporting Entities).

State/INR Program.

3. CIRIS uses to date are varied. Rack-ups of community resources as whole and by major programs serve to provide quick overviews. Detailed data has provided materials for further analysis in technical studies, such as the current ELINT study being conducted by Dr. Oldham's office with DASD(I). CIRIS information has gone into some NSSM study efforts, and into a current effort by CIA/OSR related to Soviet Intelligence. CIRIS "slices" of resources have helped focus attention on areas of intelligence resources that appear to require special attention in the course of DoD program reviews. For security purposes, all CIRIS dissemination is controlled under policy guidance from the DCI implemented through D/DCI/NIPE and NIRB. Dissemination to date has been very limited, due to security precautions.

4. The basic rationale for CIRIS is that it is not possible to make orderly analyses of intelligence programs or types of intelligence activities without cutting across agency and service lines. There must be a common, official data base which racks up information in an orderly and uniform manner. This serves as a take-off point for detailed substantive analyses.

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5. CIRIS identifies the mix and focus of intelligence resources. It also measures changes therein. This is particularly important at a time when intelligence resources are likely to be increasingly limited, and more closely reviewed outside the intelligence community. It is important that we clearly understand ourselves and our business, and that we have a central source of information that permits coherent and uniform answers to be provided.

6. CIRIS was not intended as a mechanism to measure the value of intelligence activities or the worth of the output. CIRIS is intended as a service of common concern and an objective, impartial statement of what intelligence resources are and how it is planned to employ them -- as stated by the respective Program Managers with regard to their own resources. CIRIS simply is a mechanism to force resource managers to talk in a common language.

7. CIRIS should not become involved in partisan advocacy. The DCI CIRIS Staff has a fiduciary duty -- under NIRB control -- to preserve the confidentiality of the management data of each agency, service or program. NIRB, under the general policy guidance of the DCI, should establish specific guidelines for the dissemination of specific CIRIS displays and data tabulations. At present, each contributor to CIRIS receives back only his own data, with DASD(I), of course, receiving all of the DoD data. CIRIS Staff does not disseminate CIA data outside of CIA; it would do so only if a specific authorization were given in advance, such authorization coming from the DDCEI and/or the D/DCI/NIFE.

8. The sharing of CIRIS data will become increasingly important. As we move further into community management, it will be necessary for NIRB, with DCI approval, to direct that more information be made available to senior levels of intelligence management. In my opinion, however, there is a case for excluding the totality of DDP from this sharing of information with agencies outside CIA. The CIA's activity and resources with respect to the technical sensors (e.g., IMAGERY, COMINT, ELINT, TELEMETRY) are pretty well known to other agencies through working level liaisons of people in the same business, and there does not seem any longer a strong justification to hold back this kind of information, especially when it is becoming increasingly important to create a feeling of reciprocity among community managers. All of this, however, should be worked out on a case by case basis, with NIRB review and approval.

9. Some resources and activities are inherently capable of being more specifically described than others. We all recognize that Clandestine HUMINT activities cannot be described, in advance, with very much specificity. I think that the DCI CIRIS Staff and DDP Management people are in agreement on this, and I believe that the DDP CIRIS data this year will be more meaningful and valuable both to DDP and to CIRIS than heretofore, in spite of the inevitable lack of specifness.

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10. Misapprehension about CIRIS Detail. There has been concern, and perhaps misapprehension, among some people who have had only a limited exposure to CIRIS that we expect more detail from CIA than is the case. That is, if one only looks at the extensive and detailed CIRIS structure, one might assume that it would be a man-killing job to provide all that information. The fact is, however, that we do not ask everybody to tell us everything. Rather, the CIRIS structure has to be extensive and detailed because we must find a "home" for all of the parts of the intelligence community, all of the diverse activities, all of the different kinds of resources, and all of their different types of hardware and techniques. But there are only a fairly small number of organizational components reporting to CIRIS that perform a considerable variety of different activities. Most CIRIS Reporting Entities do only one or two things and their reporting into CIRIS is quite straightforward and not an undue burden on the submitters.

11. CIRIS -- like any data base -- can be misused. This possibility has caused concern to us and to some other senior people reviewing the Planning, Programming and Budgeting world. Any tool must be used with discrimination and by an experienced person. We have a continuous job to do in the DCI CIRIS Staff to help people learn to use CIRIS properly and correctly. We have to carry this out in step with the policy directions of NIRB with regard to the release of specified CIRIS data to specified users.

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30 April 1971  
Working Paper: WPP

SUBJECT: CIRIS Structure Compared to CIA/OPPB Program Structure

1. On the whole, the CIRIS structure that is used for the community, including data inputs from CIA, and the OPPB Program structure are synonymous in many important areas, and are only divergent significantly in two respects. Both of these are discussed below, and in my opinion neither presents a very difficult problem to resolve; these are Counterintelligence and Info Processing.

2. The CIA/OPPB Program structure, through which management data is provided from the Directorates to OPPB in order to construct the Agency's program and budget, is subdivided as follows:

- Collection (including Counterintelligence; i.e., FI/CI)
- Information Processing & Exploitation
- Production
- Research & Development
- Communications
- Covert Action
- Program Wide

3. The CIRIS structure compared with the CIA/OPPB structure as follows:

Collection. In CIRIS, this is called Positive Intelligence Collection and the two are synonymous as far as HUMINT Collection is concerned. CIRIS does not handle Counterintelligence here, but rather as a separate Mission, due to the fact that military counterintelligence is a large activity and treated separately by the Services. Although in an operational sense, FI and CI are interrelated in the Clandestine Services, the DDP has had four years experience with CIRIS/TOD and does not seem to have any trouble in making this distinction for CIRIS. Adding the two CIRIS Missions (PI-Coll. and Counterintel.) together equates to the CIA breakout of Collection by OPPB.

Information Processing & Exploitation. In CIRIS, Positive Intelligence Processing deals only with the black box sensors (i.e. IMAGERY, COMINT, ELINT, TELEMETRY, RADINT, ACOUSTINT, A.E.). The CIA/OPPB structure includes these, and in addition covers such matters as information retrieval and centralized computer services, the library function, and dissemination services. While CIRIS and OPPB structures cover different areas, there is no serious philosophical difference; this is, rather, a technical area that we all agree needs to be rationalized and harmonized, and we are in agreement to do it during this year. It is technically complicated because it also involves DIA and NSA.

Production. In CIRIS, this is called Positive Intelligence Production. There is no difference between CIRIS and CIA/OPPB structures.

Research & Development. There is no difference between CIA/OPPB and CIRIS in concept. The CIRIS total for CIA is the same as the OPPB Program Memorandum total of resources. The difference between the two is only in

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how this information is displayed: CIA puts it all together in one package; CIRIS associates each piece of R&D activity with the operational activity that the R&D supports. But CIRIS computers can tabulate R&D as a separate whole, so both CIRIS and CIA/OPPB come out at the same place.

Communications. There is no difference between CIRIS and CIA/OPPB structures.

Covert Action. CIRIS does not include Covert Action resources as part of the community data base. CIA requires DDP to provide a CIRIS-format input on the use of these resources, so that OPPB can present a total Agency resource tabulation in CIRIS format.

Program-Wide. CIRIS calls this Multi-Mission Support. To a very large extent these two are synonymous, including such totalities as Training, Security, Personnel, Logistics. There is no difficulty as between CIRIS and the OPPB structure, nor workload imposed on Agency inputters to CIRIS because these support-type activities are not target-oriented, and hence their CIRIS inputs are very simple to prepare.

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